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Students Brief 
DEFE1CE EXPENDITURE IN SCOTLAND 
by GAVIN KENNEDY, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
Guns versus Butter is the most frequent example used by lecturers to 
illustrate the nature of economic choice to students. Samuelson was the 
first to popularise the example while introducing the subject of production 
possibility frontiers in the first edition of his economics textbook in 
1948, and it soon passed into the literature. However, the choice is as 
old as the subject of economics itself, for we find Adam Smith in his 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), posing 
the question of 'opulence or defence' and settling for the latter. His 
reasoning finds a modern echo today: an independent opulent country that 
did not defend itself against warlike neighbours would soon cease to be both 
independent and opulent. 
Scotland, like any other part of the United Kingdom, is defended by the 
resources provided by the UK defence budget of approximately £12 billion a 
year. If we were simply assessing the annual (and strictly notional) 
contribution from Scotland to the rest of the UK of its share of the UK 
defence budget it would be appropriate to take some ratio of Scotland to the 
UK and apply it to the defence budget. This has been the practice in the 
past and the most popular Scottish ratio appears to be that of its 
population as a percentage of the UK's, though others have been suggested 
(such as the ratio of Scottish GDP, or personal income). On a population 
basis the Scottish 'share* of UK defence expenditure would be in the order 
of £1 billion a year, or just under 10$. 
However, such attributed ratios have a strictly limited value in that their 
choice is arbitrary - one ratio compared to another could produce shares 
varying by many tens of millions of pounds - and their economic meaning is 
unclear. No such actual budgetary transfers within the regions of the UK 
takes place and notional transfers of this nature do not correspond in any 
way to the actual transfer of military resources. 
The actual disposition of military resources within Scotland (or any other 
part of the UK) is not determined by population or any other ratios but by 
what is thought necessary for the defence of the UK as a whole. Hence, an 
economist's interest in the UK defence expenditure in Scotland must be based 
on the strategic or convenience criteria of the Ministry of Defence - in 
other words it must account for actual and not notional expenditures. 
•The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of 
the Fraser of Allander Institute. 
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Defence as a subject suffers from a dearth of reliable data. There are 
very good reasons for this. Defence data is, or can be, useful to those 
who have little regard for the interests of the UK. Hence, there is a veil 
of secrecy imposed by government on defence matters. If this is regarded 
as irksome in a democracy we should note that the Soviet Union provides a 
single line for defence in its state budget and resolutely refuses to 
disclose anything more either to its own or to foreign citizens. Moreover, 
the official Soviet Defence Budget has remained static at 17 billion roubles 
for nearly ten years though by western estimates it totals about 80 billion 
roubles and has been expanding at more than 5% per year. Soviet defence 
spending must represent something like 10? to 14% of Soviet GNP (compared to 
less than half that in the NATO countries). 
In contrast, the UK produces a 150 page Annual Statement on the Defence 
Estimates that provides minute details of defence expenditures and policy 
(even the marital status of its forces, how many telephone extensions have 
been 'saved' in cuts and the sickness records of service personnel etc). 
The disposition of UK defence forces, their costs and equipment are given 
each year and additional details are provided in the reports of the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Defence. In the case of the United States of 
America, the amount of detail made public about its defence forces is even 
more impressive. Literally, volumes of detail are printed each year and it 
is not unusual for the US government to make public what is still officially 
secret in the UK. 
However, even with all this detail it is still not possible to get the kind 
of information of interest to research workers and, quite rightly, we cannot 
realistically expect the Ministry to provide information just because it 
might be of interest to economists! We must make do with what is available 
and make intelligent estimates of the rest. 
Scotland's geographic position gives it a strategic importance in the 
provision of UK defence. Much attention is given to the UK commitment to 
the defence of Federal Germany against a possible invasion by Warsaw Pact 
(WARPAC) armed forces. This British commitment was agreed in the Brussels 
Treaty of 1955 which requires a British army of 55,000 troops to be 
permanently stationed in Federal Germany. These troops constitute the 
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and they are supported by the Second 
Tactical Airforce of the RAF. In all, this British treaty commitment (to 
defend a 65 kilometer wide stretch of the German border) costs £1.9 billion 
a year to the British taxpayer. 
Naturally, the focus of attention in Britain tends to be concentrated on the 
'central German front' and this leads the casual observer to think of 
Scotland as a 'rear area' of UK defence. Nothing, however, could be 
further from the truth. Britain faces not one front but two, and the 
second front is to the north of Scotland in what is known as the 'Faeroes 
Gap* (a line running from Greenland through Iceland and the Faeroes to the 
northern coast of Scotland). 
The area to the north of Scotland is vital to the security of Britain and 
its North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) allies. It is through this air and sea 
space that the Soviet Union's forces have to pass if they are to get into 
the North Atlantic. The Soviet Northern Fleet is the largest of the four 
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Russian f l e e t s d i spe r sed throughout the world. I t has over 270 submarines 
( o f w h i c h 90 a r e n u c l e a r m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s ) and 250 s u r f a c e s h i p s . 
A l t o g e t h e r t h e manpower of t h i s f o r c e t o t a l s over 120 ,000 . In a d d i t i o n , 
t h e S o v i e t Long Range A i r f o r c e r e g u l a r l y f l i e s m i s s i o n s from t h e Kola 
P e n i n s u l a r down t h e c o a s t of Norway and t h e e a s t and west c o a s t of t h e UK 
and back t o i t s bases in the Sovie t Union. 
For t h e UK, t h e S o v i e t commitment of a i r and n a v a l f o r c e s in t h e a i r and sea 
s p a c e t o t h e n o r t h of t h e UK makes S c o t l a n d in t h e f r o n t l i n e a s f a r a s 
d e f e n c e i s c o n c e r n e d . I t i s t o be e x p e c t e d t h e r e f o r e t h a t de fence 
p rov i s ion in Scot land would r e f l e c t t h i s s t r a t e g i c importance. 
Table 1 shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n of defence employment in Scot land, 
TABLE 1 DEFENCE EMPLOYMENT IN SCOTLAND 
Armed Forces 
of which (approximately): 
Royal Navy 
Royal Air Force 
Army 
MOD Civilians 
MOD Contractors 
TOTAL 
9,000 
4,500 
4,500 
18,000 
22,000 
13,000 
53,000 
The s t r i k i n g po in t in t h i s t a b l e i s the ex ten t of the commitment of defence 
fo r ce s to the mar i t ime r o l e in Scot land . Of the 18,000 uniformed se rv i ce 
personnel in Scot land about 13,500 are in the Royal Navy or Royal Ai r fo rce . 
The b a l a n c e of a b o u t 4 ,500 a r e in t h e Army. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s 
dep loyment i s h e i g h t e n e d when i t i s no t ed t h a t t h e bu lk of t he army 
p e r s o n n e l a r e not d ep loyed in S c o t l a n d in an o p e r a t i o n a l s e n s e ; they a r e 
almost e x c l u s i v e l y on a 'home pos t ing 'o r t r a i n i n g t o u r . The 45 Commando, 
s t a t i o n e d a t A r b r o a t h , i s t a s k e d t o dep loyment t o n o r t h e r n Norway in t h e 
even t of h o s t i l i t i e s be ing t h r e a t e n e d but t h i s i s t h e only u n i t s t a t i o n e d 
h e r e w i t h such a r o l e . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e M i n i s t r y of Defence does not 
envisage the use of the Army in the defence of Scot land. 
The naval and a i r f o r c e deployments are almost exc lu s ive ly o p e r a t i o n a l . The 
mar i t ime fo rces deployed in Scot land must be able to p a t r o l the a i r and sea 
space of t h e F a e r o e s Gap, m o n i t o r a l l movements t h r o u g h i t and be a b l e t o 
in t e rvene e f f e c t i v e l y t h e r e i f necessa ry . An a b i l i t y to 'plug the Gap' i s 
g iven a h igh p r i o r i t y in B r i t i s h d e f e n c e p r o v i s i o n s . Th i s i s one r ea son 
why t he r e are a l so 2,400 United S t a t e s naval personnel s t a t i o n e d in Scotland 
a t the Holy Loch submarine base and a t the Edzel l communications c e n t r e . 
One ins t rument for meeting these r o l e s i s provided by the B r i t i s h submarine 
squadron t h a t i s based a t F a s l a n e on t h e Clyde . B r i t i s h n u c l e a r powered 
' h u n t e r k i l l e r 1 or a t t a c k ' s u b m a r i n e s engage in long p a t r o l s in t h e n o r t h 
A t l a n t i c and they are s u p p l i e d , r e p a i r e d , and r e f i t t e d from Faslane on the 
C l y d e and R o s y t h , n e a r E d i n b u r g h . They a r e c o n t r o l l e d by t h e 
communications headqua r t e r s a t P i t r e a v i e in F i f e . 
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In addition, there is a maritime contribution from the RAF, flying out of 
the alrstations at Lossiemouth, Kinloss, Leuchars, Macrihanish and 
Stornoway. This consists of two elements: maritime surveillance (Nimrods) 
and interception (Phantoms etc). The surveillance role is crucial in anti-
submarine warfare, and brings aircraft, surface ships and submarines into 
co-ordinated search and destroy missions of enemy submarines and surface 
ships. 
Modern technology requires early warning and identification of approaching 
aircraft and to this end a system of radar stations are sited across 
Scotland. There is a master radar station at Buchan (nr Aberdeen), 
supported by 'slave' nations in the Faeroes, Saxa Vord (Shetland) and 
Benbecula (Hebrides). These stations are absolutely essential to the 
maritime and air defence of the UK, for without them the interceptors would 
not know what to look for, or where to look. 
The RAF also has important training areas in Scotland (Cape Wrath, Tain and 
Rosehearty) for bombing and low flying practice. But the bulk of its 
forces have an operational role. 
Faslane is also the home base of the Polaris submarine fleet. This nuclear 
strategic force consists of four boats, one of which is always on station 
somewhere in the north Atlantic. It acts as Britain's nuclear deterrent 
and its power is awesome, to say the least. Each Polaris submarine packs 
more explosive power than all the ordnance dropped in World War 2 and could 
fire its 16 missiles in about 5 minutes at 15 minutes notice from London. 
British policy makes absolutely clear to the Soviet Union that in the event 
of a nuclear attack on the UK, the Government reserves the right to respond 
and inflict considerable damage to the Soviet Union beyond any conceivable 
gains they could make by attacking the UK. The military significance of 
this powerful deterrent force is regarded as being such that no sane 
government in the Soviet Union would safely contemplate a nuclear attack on 
the UK without risking utter destruction of its own territory. 
So much for the 'hardware' deployed in Scotland. What of the actual 
expenditures? Here we begin to encounter data deficiencies. Take 
manpower for instance. According to statistics issued by the Scottish 
Office there are approximately 37,000 domiciled Scots serving in the UK 
armed forces. This is considerably more than the numbers of service 
personnel stationed in Scotland (18,000). Clearly, the majority of the 
37,000 Scots who normally reside here are stationed elsewhere at any one 
moment. The low numbers of army personnel in Scotland (under 5,000) 
suggest that the bulk of the Scottish regiments are assigned to duty tours 
in BA0R, Hong Kong, Belize, Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, Falklands and the 
rest of the UK. In a sense, Scotland 'exports' military man (and woman) 
power in the army and 'imports' maritime forces from the rest of the UK, 
though the exact balance cannot be established - obviously some Scottish 
servicemen join the Royal Navy, the marines and the RAF. 
Of the £12 billion spent on defence, how much is spent in Scotland? This 
calculation must be distinguished from shares of total UK defence 
expenditure attributed to Scotland using some global ratio or other. For 
example, consider the complications of using the ratio of 37,000 domiciled 
Scots to the UK armed forces (340,000 in 1980). In what sense can we 
consider income of the 37,000 Scottish servicemen being spent in Scotland 
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when the evidence shows that most of the servicemen (and their families) are 
on postings outside Scotland at any one moment? 
Or take, for instance, the question of military hardware produced in the 
rest of the UK and deployed in Scotland. What economic meaning is there in 
assigning the cost of, say, the nuclear submarines which were built in 
Barrow in England to the Scottish economy? Obviously none at all. The 
capital cost of the nuclear submarines is expended at the time of their 
construction. There is no economic meaning to depreciation in defence 
costs as the submarines do not earn an income stream to pay for them. The 
capital costs of the submarines (and all other defence equipment) are 
charged to the defence budget at the time of the expenditure and they are 
not depreciated over their service life. Hence, if no Scottish firms 
contributed to the construction of the nuclear submarines there can be no 
expenditure arising from their construction that can be credited to the 
Scottish economy. 
In the case of the running costs of the submarines, these can be regarded as 
expenditures in Scotland if the resources are purchased from within the 
Scottish economy. If Scottish firms supply oils, parts, victuals, services 
and such like to the submarine base at Faslane, or the refitting yard at 
Rosyth, they receive incomes for doing so and these are injections into the 
Scottish economy. Of course, the largest input into the Scottish economy 
is likely to be that of incomes of personnel working for the Ministry of 
Defence at its Scottish bases and this can be estimated from the employment 
figures provided by the MOD. 
The general point must stand, namely, that the original hardware costs of 
the defence equipment used in Scotland had an economic effect confined to 
the regions where they were procured and not the Scottish economy. But 
Scotland, like other regions of the UK, does have a share in defence 
procurement. Yarrows builds frigates, Ferranti and Marconi-GEC supply 
electronics for aircraft, missiles and helicopters, and British Aerospace 
builds light trainers and supplies refitting of engines (as does Rolls 
Royce). These are direct expenditures into the Scottish economy (net of 
any inputs purchased into Scotland from elsewhere - a modern frigate, for 
instance, would import from the rest of the UK about 60% of its cost). 
There are large gaps in data of actual defence expenditures in Scotland and 
we are compelled to find a method of estimation that bears some resemblance 
to reality. In the absence of official figures we must make the assumption 
that employment is proportional to total costs. In the case of service 
personnel and civil servants this is reasonable as pay and allowances are 
nationally negotiated. For contractor employment it is also reasonable as 
the mix of procurement expenditure is not geographically determined, ie the 
'high' technology industries are represented in Scotland, as are the more 
basic items. Only in the case of 'other expenditure', which covers land 
and buildings, works and buildings, miscellaneous stores and services, fuel, 
clothing and administration etc, does the estimate risk being arbitrary. 
The alternative is no estimate at all, which places an unrealistic demand 
for accuracy in what is after all, merely a 'working guess'. Hence, in 
Table 2, the Scottish defence employment under each category is taken as a 
proportion of total UK defence expenditure under that category and for 
'other expenditures' the average of the other ratios is used. 
31 
In Table 2 the estimated defence expenditure in Scotland is shown. This 
suggests a direct expenditure into Scotland from MOD of about £770 million. 
The nature of the data precludes a more accurate figure of the net flow of 
defence expenditures into Scotland. For instance, some of the incomes 
TABLE 2 ESTIMATED DEFEICE EXPENDITURES IN SCOTLAND, 1980/81 
PRINCIPAL HEADINGS 
UK DEFEICE BUDGET 
Armed Forces and Civilian Pay, 
Pensions and Allowances 
Defence Equipment 
Other Expenditures 
Total 
UK TOTALS 
£ BILLION 
4.9 
5.4 
2.0 
12.3 
SCOTLAND 
£ MILLION 
338 
297 
135 
770 
received by Royal Navy and RAF personnel will be remitted to their families 
in the rest of the UK and some of the incomes of Scottish troops stationed 
elsewhere will flow in the reverse direction. Also, some Scottish firms 
will be sub-contractors of firms elsewhere in the UK who are supplying MOD 
with equipment and some firms outside Scotland will be in the reverse 
relationship. The extent of the leakages from or to the Scottish economy 
cannot be discovered without additional details. 
We do know that about £770 million is a 'first guess' estimate of UK defence 
expenditure in Scotland and that this represents about 53,000 jobs. We 
also know the deployment of defence forces in Scotland and its strategic 
importance to UK (and NATO) defence. For the moment that is about the 
extent of our public knowledge about defence and the Scottish economy. 
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